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Nineteen-eighty has been a traumatic year for the international
airline industry. The explosive increase in the price of fuel, the
grounding of a substantial portion of our fuel-efficient fleets,
worldwide monetary instability and, in the United States, the
lengthy United Airlines strike may have come close to straining in-
dustry's capacity to adapt to a changing environment. But one of the
remarkable characteristics of this industry is its ability to survive. This
year's problems-like similar difficulties in past years-will be sur-
mounted, not by the actions of governments, but by the ingenuity
and imagination of airline managements throughout the world.
Despite the concern of the effects and implications of the chang-
ing regulatory regime in the United States upon foreign-based avia-
tion enterprises, deregulation in the United States has been a re-
markable success. One only has to contrast the impact of the 1973-74
fuel crisis with the present situation to see how much more success-
fully domestic United States airlines have been able to cope in these
difficult times. This domestic experience is now being drawn on to
reshape United States international air transportation policy. Three of
the major elements of this new policy are: (1) the new and evolving
format of recent bilateral air transportation agreements;' (2) the Civil
Aeronautics Board's (CAB or Board) investigation of the International
Air Transportation Association (IATA); and (3) the new legislation
governing regulation of airlines flying international routes to and from
the United States. That legislation, the International Air Transporta-
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tion Competition Act of 1979,2 was signed into law on February 15,
1980.
It is important not only to understand the new U.S. policy, but
also to consider its implications for international air transportation.
The comprehensive nature of the regulatory change in United States
aviation policy, and the large fraction of the world's aviation to which
it applies, have made it a phenomenon impossible for aviation execu-
tives and government policymakers around the world to ignore.
I. THE UNITED STATES' BILATERAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENTS
Perhaps the most significant international development in the
past years has occurred on the bilateral front, where the United
States has been able to change the legal framework for entry and
price control that has characterized its international air relationships
for more than thirty years. A brief review of history indicates that the
modern international air transportation system developed from
agreements at the Chicago Convention in 1944,3 where decisions
were reached in many important technical areas and on some of the
basic rules governing air travel from one sovereign state to another. A
number of economic questions, however, were left unresolved by the
Chicago Convention. The United Kingdom sought close government
control and supervision over fares and capacity, while the United
States sought a greater level of competitive freedom-more than most
other countries were willing to allow.
Shortly after Chicago, the two major players, the United States
and the United Kingdom, met in Bermuda to try to resolve, on a
bilateral basis, the major pricing and entry issues that had remained
open. After extensive negotiations, a compromise, the Bermuda
Agreement, 4 was struck. The British agreed to impose no prior re-
straints on capacity and to permit each country to designate more than
one airline to provide service. The United States, on the other hand,
agreed to full unilateral governmental control over pricing policy and
fares.
For the next thirty years, the Bermuda Agreement became the
basic pattern for aviation agreements between the United States and
more than sixty other nations around the world. In most of these
2. Pub. L. No. 96-192, § 17, 94 Stat. 42 (1980).
3. Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
4. Feb. 11, 1946, United States - United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No.
1507.
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agreements, new capacity proposed by a carrier must be allowed for
at least six months. In all these agreements, either government could
block any new fare proposed by any carrier. Charters were generally
allowed by informal agreements, with rather strict conditions. Most
agreements allowed multiple designation-the designation of more
than one airline to serve each market-although none of the United
States' major trading partners expected or even contemplated that
their national carrier would have to face competition from a large
number of U.S. carriers over the same route.
In 1976, the United Kingdom, exercising the right contained in
the agreement, denounced Bermuda 1.5 According to the terms of
the Agreement, termination became effective one year from the date
of denunciation. Not surprisingly, extensive negotiations were held in
the interim and a new agreement-Bermuda 11-was reached by
the Carter Administration and the United Kingdom. While no one in
Washington was quite ready to admit it, the new agreement was in
many ways more restrictive than the Bermuda I Agreement it re-
placed, particularly as it required service reductions, specifically be-
tween Boston and London. The reaction to Bermuda II in the United
States was vociferous and forced the administration to re-examine the
restrictionist principles which had come to govern U.S. international
aviation activities.
By the fall of 1977, a policy shift had occurred in the U.S. gov-
ernment favoring bilateral arrangements offering more, not less, flexi-
bility. In August of 1978, President Carter issued a Statement on
International Air Transportation Policy which affirmed the principles
of price competition and multiple entry as goals of United States in-
ternational aviation relationships with other nations.
7
Since November 1977, the United States has renegotiated over a
dozen new agreements with other countries, 8 and has, for the most
part, been able to apply these principles to the agreements. The
Netherlands Agreement 9 in early 1978 was an important first step. 10
Later that year, major liberal agreements were concluded with Bel-
5. Id.
6. Bermuda II, July 23, 1977, United States - United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 5367,
T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
7. Statement concerning United States Policy on the Conduct of International
Air Transport Negotiations, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1462 (Aug. 28, 1978).
8. E.g., Protocol Amending the Air Transport Agreement of 1957, as amended,
Mar. 31, 1978, United States - Netherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 1507.
9. Id.
10. Agreement Amending the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1946, as
Amended, Dec. 12 - Dec. 14, 1978, United States - Belgium, T.I.A.S. No. 9207.
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gium and Israel. 1 For the most part, advances on the pricing side of
the ledger, country-of-origin, 1 2 and, later, dual disapproval pricing ar-
ticles, were adopted. 13 The Israeli Agreement, for example, allowed
designated airlines to set fares freely; both governments, however,
can reject a fare by agreeing that it is unacceptable. (This is an exam-
ple of a dual disapproval rate article.) In addition, the new agree-
ments contained no limitations on capacity; and the right of multiple
designation was specifically provided for. In some cases, as between
the United States and Israel, charters are explicitly allowed to operate
for the first time.
Similar progress has taken place in other parts of the world. For
example, some progress has been made during 1979-1980 in liberaliz-
ing air service in the Pacific. New agreements have been reached
with Singapore, 14 Thailand, 15 and Korea. 16 Under the arrangement
with Korea, new service was initiated last spring by Korean Air
Lines, new low fares were offered by Northwest Airlines, and Braniff
Airways initiated new service to Seoul.
In the South Pacific, despite some deep fundamental differences
on aviation policy between the United States and Australia, a one-
year country-of-origin pricing agreement was reached in December
1978.17 Unhappily, fares remain high between the United States
and Japan, capacity is tightly restricted by the Japanese Government,
and U.S. charter carriers are not accepted.
Only a little progress (from the perspective of the United States)
has been made in Latin America. Central America seems to be mov-
ing slowly towards a more competitive aviation regime. Nevertheless,
a fairly liberal agreement with Costa Rica " was concluded and
Guatamala is welcoming new United States service. While prospects
11. Protocol Amending the Air Transport Agreement of 1950, as amended, Aug.
16, 1978, United States - Israel, T.I.A.S. No. 9002.
12. "Country-of-origin articles" permit a subscribing government to control only
the airline fares for traffic originating in its own country. In contrast, Bermuda I-type
agreements granted a government the power to disapprove fares unilaterally.
13. "Dual disapproval pricing articles" permit designated airlines to set fares
freely. A government can intervene to reject a fare thus set only if it secures the
consent of the other government.
14. Air Transport Agreement, Mar. 31, 1979, United States - Singapore, T.I.A.S.
No. 9001.
15. Air Transport Agreement, with Annexes, Dec. 7, 1979, United States - Thai-
land (unpublished) [reported in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 2035 (1980).]
16. Agreement Amending the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957, as
Amended, Mar. 14 - Mar. 22, 1979, United States - Republic of Korea, T.I.A.S. No.
9427.
17. Unpublished. On file at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.
18. Unpublished.
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are good that other Central American countries will be willing to ex-
pand service, most governments in South America appear to remain
convinced that both capacity and fares should be closely controlled.
The major irony in this new era in U.S. international aviation
policy is that the form of our bilateral agreement with our most sig-
nificant trading partner remains more restrictive than the norm. The
United States and the United Kingdom have entered into an amend-
ment to Bermuda II which, in the next four years, will significantly
expand the service options available to consumers traveling between
the two nations.19 Unfortunately, the United Kingdom Agreement
does not provide all of the benefits sought by the United States. But
the potential opening of thirteen new gateways and the additional
designations at Miami and Boston will make it virtually impossible for
any particular carrier to exercise market power, and the new service
will therefore maximize consumer options. Also, the United King-
dom's pledge to continue its liberal pricing policy and to consider
additional liberalizations two years from now tends to insure the
overall procompetitive nature of this agreement. The British have
moved a long way from the limited confines of Bermuda II.
II. THE C.A.B.'s INVESTIGATION OF I.A.T.A.'s
RATE-FIXING ACTIVITIES
The second, and by far the most controversial, aspect of the U.S.
program to revise its international aviation relationships was the
CAB's investigation of the IATA Traffic Conference Machinery, in-
itiated in 1978. For legal reasons, this matter was styled as an "Order
to Show Cause." The Board proposed a careful reexamination of the
IATA ratemaking machinery and, as is appropriate under governing
legal standards, placed the burden on IATA to demonstrate why ap-
proval, and hence United States antitrust immunity, should not be
withdrawn from IATA price-fixing functions.
The IATA machinery, as initially approved by the Board in 1946,
together with Bermuda II, formed the basis for the regulation of
entry and pricing in international air transportation. Since rates had
to be approved by both parties to the bilateral agreement, it made
sense to allow the carriers on both sides to first agree on the rate
structure. In addition, the Board's 1946 approval was prompted by a
desire to correct a deficiency in the Board's statutory authority over
international fares and rates. At the time, the Board's international
19. Agreement Amending the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1977, as Mod-
ified, Apr. 14 - Apr. 25, 1978, United States - United Kingdom, T.I.A.S. No. 8965.
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authority was limited to preventing discrimination against United
States air carriers under section 1002(f) of the Federal Aviation
Act,20 and to approval or disapproval of agreements filed pursuant to
section 412.21 The Board did not have any power to suspend and
investigate tariff filings for international fares and rates. Since the
IATA machinery, as proposed in 1946, required Board approval of
agreed fares and rates under section 412 prior to their filing, it pro-
vided the Board with the necessary mechanism to exert control over
such matter.
Other factors seem also to have played a prominent role in the
Board's 1946 decision. At the time, Europe was struggling to recover
economically from the ravages of World War II and European carriers
were financially very weak, if they existed at all. United States car-
riers, on the other hand, held dominant competitive positions and
were rapidly extending their operations throughout the world. Our
European allies sought assurances that international air fares would
be high enough to permit the development of their own airline indus-
tries. In particular, Britain and France feared that the United States
would be unable to control the pricing practices of strong U.S. car-
riers, and insisted that these carriers operate at fares approved by
international agreement.
By 1978, however, most of the reasons for approval of the IATA
mechanism no longer seemed to apply. First, in 1972, Congress
enacted section 1002(j) of the Federal Aviation Act, 22 which empow-
ered the Board to suspend, investigate, and utlimately disapprove,
20. Pub. L. 85-726, § 1002(f), 72 Stat. 788 (1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f)
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)). "Whenever ... the Board shall be of the opinion that any
individual . . . or fare . . . received by any air carrier or foreign air carrier is ...
unjustly discriminatory .... the Board may alter the same to the extent necessary to
correct such discrimination .
21.
The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement
.. . that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this
Act, and shall, by order, approve any such contract or agreement . . . that
it does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this
Act....
Pub. L. 85-726, § 412(b), 72 Stat. 770 (1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
22.
Whenever any air carrier . . shall file . . . a Tariff stating a new
individual or joint . . . rate . . .or any . . . regulation . .. affecting such
rate, ... the Board . . . may suspend the operation of such Tariff ... for
a period ... not exceeding three hundred and sixty-five days in the
aggregate beyond the time when such Tariff would otherwise go into ef-
fect.
Pub. L. 92-259, § 3(a), 86 Stat. 96 (1972) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 14820) (1970).
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any tariff containing a fare or rate which the Board deemed unlawful,
subject only to final approval by the President. Second, the nature of
international air transportation also had changed substantially. United
States carriers no longer dominated the North Atlantic as they had in
1946 and the economic bargaining power and strength of foreign car-
riers was no longer in question. From the Board's perspective, it
simply was no longer reasonable to assume that U.S. carriers alone
had the resources to flourish in a competitive environment.
The prevailing transatlantic situation provided a good example of
this new competitive environment. In the fall of 1977, Laker Airways
initiated its low-fare "Skytrain" service between New York and Lon-
don, causing a considerable reshuffling of deep-discount promotional
fares across the Atlantic. IATA carriers were subsequently unable to
agree to a new transatlantic fare structure to meet Laker's competi-
tion. The agreed structure expired in the spring of 1978, creating an
"open rate" situation-each IATA carrier was free to set its own fares,
subject to approval by the governments involved.
At about the same time, relaxation of charter rules led to lower
fares for a greater portion of the traveling public. Responsive com-
petitive filings by the scheduled air carriers followed. New low fare
concepts, like budget, standby and super-APEX fares were im-
plemented.
Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for the Board to conclude that
these developments appeared to represent "an example of competi-
tive economic forces at work," indicating that IATA was not "the sole
mechanism through which . . . mutually beneficial aviation relation-
ships could be structured." 2 3 And since there was no assurance that
further progress toward a more competitive atmosphere would occur
as long as the IATA ratemaking structure remained intact, it appeared
that the time was ripe for a review.
The Board's Show Cause Order couched its concerns in terms of
United States antitrust law. Board approval of IATA agreements, in-
cluding the basic IATA conference machinery, brought with it au-
tomatic protection from prosecution under the antitrust laws. Without
Board approval, these agreements would be subject to the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 24 under which horizontal price-fixing is per se illegal. It
was recognized long ago that the Board's power to immunize inter-
carrier agreements from the antitrust laws represented a significant
departure from the rules that apply to United States industries
23. Order to Show Cause, C.A.B. 78.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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generally-a departure that was a product of the special economic cir-
cumstances which convinced Congress to create an agency to regu-
late, indeed to protect, an infant, developing industry.
By 1978, however, the rationale for economic regulation of air-
lines was less compelling and it became more difficult to accept the
continued subordination of the public policies underlying the antitrust
laws without a de novo review of IATA. In fact, the regulatory stan-
dard that had long been quoted, hut less than reverentially applied in
this area, the "Local Cartage Test, " 25 required the Board to disap-
prove anticompetitive arrangements of this sort unless it could be
shown that the arrangements were required by a serious transporta-
tion need or were necessary to secure important public benefits-a
test that was codified in the law.
26
The Show Cause Order generated vigorous controversy. The
Board was not unresponsive to the concerns expressed by U.S. trad-
ing partners around the world and took a number of steps to limit the
scope of the proceeding. Prior to the legislative hearing, IATA had
proposed amendments to its structure which envisioned a reorganiza-
tion along two functional lines-tariff coordinating conferences, deal-
ing with ratemaking activities, and trade association conferences, deal-
ing with "facilitation" activities. In the past, participation in both
ratemaking activities and facilitation activities was required of all
IATA members. Under the new rules, member participation in the
former would be optional while participation in the latter would be
mandatory. The facilitation activities consist of those functions such as
uniform baggage handling procedures and interline ticketing, which
did not appear anticompetitive in nature and most likely promote
more efficient operations. In recognition of that fact, the Board
granted interim approval to IATA's proposed reorganization and
withdrew its tentative findings with respect to the facilitation ac-
tivities. By this action, the Board narrowed its examination to IATA's
role in establishing fares and rates.
As a final step, the Board withdrew its tentative findings with
respect to IATA agreements establishing fares and rates between
foreign countries, recognizing that the paramount national interests of
other countries far outweighed U.S. interests in this area. As a result,
the scope of the proceeding was ultimately limited to IATA's estab-
lishment of fares and rates to and from the United States.
After extensive proceedings, including consultations with foreign
governments in Bogota, Brussels, and Nairobi, the Board held a
25. Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.AB. 850 (1952).
26. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
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legislative-type hearing last October 1979 and issued a tentative deci-
sion. 2 7 In essence, the Board has determined to approve the new
IATA traffic conference procedures for a period of two years, but also
to deny antitrust immunity to any U.S. airline participating in the
North Atlantic-Europe Traffic Conference discussions. Further, the
Board has announced its intention to establish a staff unit devoted to
handling all matters relating to the IATA Traffic Conference proce-
dures.
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Board concluded
that the traffic conference procedures, designed as they are primarily
to establish the rates to be charged by competing airlines in United
States-foreign markets, substantially reduce competition. But the
Board recognized that not all nations share our economic philosophy.
Therefore, the Board tried to strike a balance between the concerns
of foreign nations and the principles that guide their national policies,
and similar United States concerns for national sovereignty and
policies. The IATA decision is an attempt to reach that equilibrium.
The Board balanced the restrictive nature of these agreements against
representations made by many governmental and private participants
in the proceedings that restrictions are technically and politically es-
sential for the smooth functioning of the international air transport
network. In addition, the Board considered whether these public
benefits could be achieved by alternative means having less anticom-
petitive effects.
The Board Members were impressed by the support given to the
new IATA mechanism, not only by many witnesses familiar with the
industry, but also by the U.S. Departments of Transportation and
State, and by foreign governments which supported the pro-
competitive policies of the United States. The Board did not have the
opportunity, however, to study first hand how the new traffic confer-
ence system will operate. Nor did the CAB have a firm enough grasp
of the alternatives to say that less anticompetitive means were availa-
ble to produce the same level of transportation benefits. The Board,
therefore, concluded that the best interests of the United States, as
well as of its international aviation partners, would be served by al-
lowing IATA the trial period sought.
These concerns, coupled with the United States desire to work
with and not against other nations in the development of a more lib-
eral international aviation regime, convinced the CAB that a general
denial of antitrust immunity at this time would be in error and that
27. C.A.B. Order 79.
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two years of actual experience with the new structure would be bene-
ficial. In two years' time, the new conference system will have been
in effect almost three years and the CAB's new IATA group will have
had the opportunity to observe the rate conferences and other IATA
activities closely. In addition, during this period the opportunity
exists to look at various alternatives to the conference system.
The decision to deny antitrust immunity for U.S. air carrier par-
ticipation in the North Atlantic-Europe Traffic Conferences might
seem at first glance to be inconsistent with other goals. In order to
fully assess the new IATA structure, however, it will be most useful
to have some basis for comparison. The North Atlantic-Europe mar-
ket represents an area of the world which now, and for some time,
has not depended on the conference system. In light of the competi-
tive detriments that we believe flow from tariff coordination, it would
not be productive to encourage a return to an JATA ratemaking
mechanism in that area. In addition, the North Atlantic constitutes a
large U.S.-originating market that already is quite competitive and
served primarily by the experienced airlines of our major European
trading partners. In recent years there has been an open rate situa-
tion and, for the last two years, the relevant traffic conferences have
not even met; yet the situation is far from chaotic. Carriers have been
able to interline pasengers, negotiate joint fares, and operate success-
fully despite the fact that no U.S. carrier belongs to the traffic confer-
ence. Since the other carriers operating on these routes are some of
the strongest in the world, many of the general foreign policy con-
cerns of the United States are inapplicable.
The CAB is convinced that its action will not jeopardize the abil-
ity of IATA to function smoothly, since the status quo is being pre-
served. For the same reason, the CAB does not believe its action
discriminates against U.S. carriers, given that they voluntarily with-
drew from the conference and have not indicated any desire to re-
turn. Should it appear that U.S. carriers are disadvantaged, remedial
action can be taken before the end of the test period.
I1. THE INTERNATIONAL AIR COMPETITION ACT OF 1979
The third cornerstone of the new United States international avi-
ation policy is the International Air Transportation Competition Act of
1979 (the Act),2 8 signed into law by President Carter on February 15,
1980. The Act, modeled after the domestic Airline Deregulation Act
28. Supra note 2.
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of 1978,29 is designed to eliminate, as best one can in an imperfect
world, government intervention into the entry and ratemaking ac-
tivities of airlines flying to and from the United States. Thus, where
multiple access is allowed under the existing bilateral agreement, the
Act allows the Board to expeditiously license new carriers over multi-
ple routings.
The most significant provisions of the new Act, however, are in
the area of ratemaking, where the law provides carriers with a new
measure of fare flexibility. The Board is charged with establishing a
new "Standard Foreign Fare Level" (SFFL) for all international mar-
kets based on fares in effect on or after October 1, 1979. Once the
SFFL is established, the Board is by law precluded from suspending
any fare within a "zone of reasonableness" (five percent above or fifty
percent below the SFFL, as adjusted for inflation). The only grounds
for suspension of fares within the zone are very narrow. Thus suspen-
sion is proper only if the fare is unduly preferential or prejudicial, or
unjustly discriminatory or predatory, or if suspension is considered in
the public interest because of unreasonable regulatory actions of a
foreign government with respect to a U.S. carrier.
For one time only, the provision for fare flexibility grants the
Board authority to pass upon the reasonableness of fares in existence
on October 1, 1979. The number of markets involved, however, is
limited. Also, an oral evidentiary hearing before an administrative
judge is required and the Board must complete any such evaluation
within six months. Thus, while the Board can adjust the SFFL base
level in some markets, that power is effectively limited by the proce-
dures allowed under the new law. Nevertheless, the Board is hard at
work attempting to complete the SFFL proceeding. Twelve markets
which, based on available cost and revenue data, seem to have the
highest excess profits, have been selected for review, and the Board
expects to use its one-time power if circumstances warrant.
One other provision of the new Act should be mentioned. Over
the years, Congress has been very troubled by the fact that U.S.
carriers have been subjected to various discriminatory and restrictive
practices by foreign governments. Up until now, the Board has had
little statutory authority to move quickly in response to actions which
unfairly inhibit the rights of carriers to compete. In a more liberal
environment, equal opportunity is critically important. It is therefore
appropriate that Congress has expanded the Board's power, subject to
29. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)(compiled in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 - 1541 (West Supp. 1980).
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presidential approval, to summarily suspend, alter, or amend a
foreign carrier's operating authority in response to restrictions im-
posed abroad.3 0 While it is sincerely hoped that there will be no
need to invoke this provision of the Act, the Board is ready to redress
any legitimate grievance if the need arises.
IV. DOMESTIC DEREGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
Within this framework, two additional questions should be ad-
dressed: What are the lessons that can be learned from the United
States' deregulation experience; and, is the United States seriously
committed over the long term to insure a more flexible and open
international environment?
The first question is becoming easier to answer as time goes by.
If one studies carefully the domestic results it will be seen that
deregulation has been a great success. Similarly, while the interna-
tional environment is far more complex and the problems far more
onerous, it is expected that we will begin to see international results
that mirror the domestic case. Traffic growth in liberal markets,
which are characterized by more open entry and pricing flexibility,
will begin to exceed growth rates in those markets that remain more
restrictive. We have already begun to see some preliminary indica-
tions of this phenomenon. On the North Atlantic, the traffic share of
the liberal country group-Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom-has increased from 58% of scheduled traffic in
1977, to 60% in 1978, and 62% in 1979. 31 These shifts have occurred
despite efforts by more restrictive countries to maintain their market
share. This limited data is not dispositive, but the evidence will be-
come more compelling in the future.
As for the second question, no one should doubt the CAB's re-
solve. The decision to defer action in the IATA proceeding should not
be interpreted as an indication of retreat from principle or a reversal
of policy. Nor should one view the recently signed United States-
United Kingdorm bilateral agreement, which does not include multi-
ple entry, as a return to a more restrictive regime. On the contrary,
there are fundamental reasons to believe that United States policies
will remain steadfast as the move toward open-entry and pricing free-
30. A 1972 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 permits the C.A.B. to
'suspend the operation of any existing tariff of any foreign air carrier providing serv-
ices between the United States and such foreign country .. "" 49 U.S.C.
§ 1482(j)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975). A suspension order pursuant to §. 1482(j) is subject to
the approval of the President. 49 U.S.C. § 1461(b) (Supp. V 1975).
31. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics.
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dor is made and that, in the long run, these policies will be accepted
and adopted in many major international airline markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Public policy favoring competition, as reflected in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 and the International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979, has now been set firmly in place by the
Congress and the President. Deregulation assures that there will be
at all times a great reservoir of talent and resources ready and able to
exploit any existing or newly developed market opportunity in the
world at large. Moreover, the policy assures that U.S. airlines will be
extremely efficient, able to adapt readily to rapidly changing condi-
tions. These carriers, some existing, some still to be established, un-
doubtedly will press for access to international markets so long as
there are profitable market opportunities-and profitable market op-
portunities will be assured if less efficient, protected carriers are not
exposed to competition.
While general economic conditions may cause a downturn in
demand with the distinct possibility that airline retrenchment will be
required, there is no indication that such conditions will alter in any
fundamental way the ongoing implementation of the new United
States policies. Although one cannot rule out the possibility that such
adverse conditions will temporarily influence regulatory decisions in
particular circumstances, it seems clear that regulation by market
forces-as opposed to direct regulation by government-will permit
rapid adjustments that will minimize, if not at all times eliminate, the
adverse consequences of a general economic downturn. Current
policies will prove their worth in the days ahead, when it will be
critically important that air carrier managements be free to react in-
stantly to rapidly changing, and perhaps deteriorating, economic con-
ditions.
